Wednesday night's US-Mexico was one of the more attractive match-ups-- the game featured plenty of attacking soccer (much of it from Mexico) in a high-speed, back and forth contest. The US extended its unbeaten streak against Mexico on American soil. So why are US fans so upset by it?
Because we saw glimpses of the future of Mexico and it was frighteningly good. Young studs Gio Dos Santos and Carlos Vela completely torched the US defenders. And another pair of young standouts were out for Mexico: Guardado and Nery Castillo. But still, Landon Donovan noted just how much faster the Mexicans were willing to play. They were willing to play a more uptempo brand of football. If Mexico is a team that has relied too much on pretty soccer in the past and not enough on simply being effective, perhaps this brand of soccer marks a change.
That said, the US looked better than it sometimes does against Mexico. Frankly, they usually look awful, but are grimly effective. This time, the Americans carried the play from time to time. Yes, they didn't maintain possession as much as the Mexicans, but it generally wasn't ugly.
As far as individual performances, a couple stood out: first off, Bobby Convey had a rough game. Coach Bob Bradley attributed it to coming off of injuries. I hope so-- Convey really wasn't effective whenever he did have the ball.
While the midfield tandem of Rico Clark and Michael Bradley wasn't a success, they both showed their abilities. In the first half, Bradley really was everywhere and frequently controlled (but did not necessarily contribute to) the play. He slowed down considerably in the second half, but I found it to be an encouraging development. Since Claudio Reyna's retirement, there hasn't been anyone to control play in the middle. Bradley might be the guy. Especially if Benny Feilhaber can't get some minutes with his club...
While outside backs Ramiro Corrales and Drew Moor had especially tough nights, I thought the US generally did a better job of tracking Mexico's runs towards the box. Frequently, when Mexican attackers change the point of attack quickly, US defenders struggle to adjust. I thought Onyewu and Bocanegra did a good job of not biting (at least not as much as in the past).
The result is a disappointment: the US should be favorites on home soil. But I watch the games to be entertained-- and this game fit the bill.
Friday, February 8, 2008
Tuesday, January 22, 2008
Ball on a Budget (aka Lazio's struggles)
In case you missed it (I had), Lazio is struggling.
http://football.guardian.co.uk/breakingnews/feedstory/0,,-7244347,00.html
What I think is interesting about this article is the idea that Lazio's attempt to play football on a budget has failed. Club President Claudio Lotito sounded vaguely like a Moneyball-style baseball manager when he annouced a new strategy: "The theory that who spends most wins is no longer valid. The winner is the one who carries out a proper project, based on values."
And he put a salary cap on players: a maximum salary of 500,000 euros. That's not really too far off of MLS salaries...
And how did they do?
Their first two years, they finished in European positions, which I think shows that President Lotito is right. You can compete in Europe on a budget. At the same time, they've struggled mightily this year and might be relegated, which shows the limitations of a strategy like this without debunking it entirely.
http://football.guardian.co.uk/breakingnews/feedstory/0,,-7244347,00.html
What I think is interesting about this article is the idea that Lazio's attempt to play football on a budget has failed. Club President Claudio Lotito sounded vaguely like a Moneyball-style baseball manager when he annouced a new strategy: "The theory that who spends most wins is no longer valid. The winner is the one who carries out a proper project, based on values."
And he put a salary cap on players: a maximum salary of 500,000 euros. That's not really too far off of MLS salaries...
And how did they do?
Their first two years, they finished in European positions, which I think shows that President Lotito is right. You can compete in Europe on a budget. At the same time, they've struggled mightily this year and might be relegated, which shows the limitations of a strategy like this without debunking it entirely.
Friday, January 18, 2008
Osorio doesn't love the SuperDraft...
But he should.
Here's Coach Osorio's quote:
""If I am honest with you without criticizing or hurting anybody, I don't think there will be enough players to wait around for the second round," said New York Red Bulls coach Juan Carlos Osorio, whose first pick isn't until the second round (16th overall). "We're analyzing all our options and will decide if we should move up."
Osorio said he felt that there were five players at the adidas MLS Player Combine in Fort Lauderdale that were good enough to compete for a starting position and not more than 10 players who could make a team.
"I'm not just speaking on behalf of my own opinion but on behalf of the all the coaches as part of a general consensus," he said. "This time around doesn't have as many players as previous ones."
http://web.mlsnet.com/mls/events/superdraft/2008/article.jsp?ymd=20080117&content_id=135597&vkey=draft2008&fext=.jsp
Now, this might just be posturing, but unless this draft is the absolute worst ever (a distinction I think is held by the 1997 College Draft), you can be
certain that there will be between 6 and 12 guys that will not just make the team but have decent careers in the league. You can also be certain that one or two players from rounds three and four will make teams and perhaps even excell. How do I know? Well, I don't. No one knows about these players, which is how they get picked low. But these are players like Adam Christman (2007), Jonathan Bornstein (2006, which also featured Dyachenko and Veris, who aren't stars but could help a team like Osorio's-- whatever happened to Matt Groenwald? He looked good the few times I saw him in 2006), Chris Rolfe and Gonzalo Segares (2005), Michael Bradley, Josh Gros, David Wagenfuhr, Jeff Parke and Andy Dorman (2004), Logan Pause and Jamil Walker (2003), Alejandro Moreno and Davy Arnaud (2002), Edson Buddle, Craig Zadie, Jim Curtin, and Craig Waibel (2001).
The point here isn't that Craig Ziadie was a great player. He wasn't. But he was useful enough to contribute in MLS for four seasons. You need players like that-- and you're basically getting him for free. I wonder if Osorio really knows what he's seeing? I thought he did a great job with the Fire, but is the SuperDraft where we find out that he can't recognize the very raw talent of college youngsters?
Here's Coach Osorio's quote:
""If I am honest with you without criticizing or hurting anybody, I don't think there will be enough players to wait around for the second round," said New York Red Bulls coach Juan Carlos Osorio, whose first pick isn't until the second round (16th overall). "We're analyzing all our options and will decide if we should move up."
Osorio said he felt that there were five players at the adidas MLS Player Combine in Fort Lauderdale that were good enough to compete for a starting position and not more than 10 players who could make a team.
"I'm not just speaking on behalf of my own opinion but on behalf of the all the coaches as part of a general consensus," he said. "This time around doesn't have as many players as previous ones."
http://web.mlsnet.com/mls/events/superdraft/2008/article.jsp?ymd=20080117&content_id=135597&vkey=draft2008&fext=.jsp
Now, this might just be posturing, but unless this draft is the absolute worst ever (a distinction I think is held by the 1997 College Draft), you can be
certain that there will be between 6 and 12 guys that will not just make the team but have decent careers in the league. You can also be certain that one or two players from rounds three and four will make teams and perhaps even excell. How do I know? Well, I don't. No one knows about these players, which is how they get picked low. But these are players like Adam Christman (2007), Jonathan Bornstein (2006, which also featured Dyachenko and Veris, who aren't stars but could help a team like Osorio's-- whatever happened to Matt Groenwald? He looked good the few times I saw him in 2006), Chris Rolfe and Gonzalo Segares (2005), Michael Bradley, Josh Gros, David Wagenfuhr, Jeff Parke and Andy Dorman (2004), Logan Pause and Jamil Walker (2003), Alejandro Moreno and Davy Arnaud (2002), Edson Buddle, Craig Zadie, Jim Curtin, and Craig Waibel (2001).
The point here isn't that Craig Ziadie was a great player. He wasn't. But he was useful enough to contribute in MLS for four seasons. You need players like that-- and you're basically getting him for free. I wonder if Osorio really knows what he's seeing? I thought he did a great job with the Fire, but is the SuperDraft where we find out that he can't recognize the very raw talent of college youngsters?
Monday, January 14, 2008
Draft Days Steals
As the 2008 SuperDraft approaches, Steve Davis had this interesting article about the best draft day steals.
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/columns/story?id=498263&root=mls&cc=5901
As his list suggests, there are some real gems even deep in the SuperDrafts (of course, there are a few dogs in every first round too...) Davis' list is interesting, but he could have gone further:
37th overall, 2006: Johnathan Bornstein. Geez. The guy's left-footed-- sometimes it seems like a one-legged man could play in MLS, as long as he's left-footed. What took people so long to see the potential in the US National Team defender?
35th overall, 2005: Gonzalo Segares. A starting defender for the Fire almost since he was drafted, a finalist for Rookie of the Year, and a fringe Costa Rican national teamer.
34th overall, 2004: Josh Gros. Though sadly taking a year off from DC United due to effects from a possibly serious head injury, Gros is one of those guys you'd love to have on any team. He works hard, his skill is underrated and he's got a great understanding of the game. He's a workhorse, but even so, earned himself a cap with the US national team against Mexico.
36th overall, 2004: Michael Bradley. The kid who's now a near-lock starter for the national team and who's scored 7 goals from d-mid for his team in Holland was by no means a sure-thing in MLS. Although some fans didn't want to believe it, Bradley started to become an important player in MLS. Still, his game didn't take off until he left for Holland.
21st in the supplemental draft, 1997: Kerry Zavagnin. Another guy who might not be flashy, but who's proved himself in this league. To this day, he'd still start for most teams, and was an occasional national teamer.
Not a bad list for guys who didn't even make Davis' list, right? And this isn't even including guys like Corey Gibbs, who were picked late because they were likely headed overseas (LA in 2002 and Miami in 2001 both took late round fliers on him). It seems a little odd for Davis to include Arnaud and Christman-- both players I like, but who aren't quite on the level of Bradley or Bornstein.
A side note: one of the things that struck me while going down the lists is how much deeper the draft seems to be now. But is that the result of college soccer producing better players (unlikely), the improvement of scouting (definitely possible) or the fact that younger, talented players view MLS as a stable possibility and forego years of college (or simply skip it altogether)? I think all three are all somewhat true, but the latter two probably contribute most the depth of the draft. I'd love to take a look at whether players in the draft are getting younger (I think they are). Of course, the fact that so many decent players have been picked in the third or fourth round in recent years also suggests that, while scouting may have improved, it's still got a ways to go...
http://soccernet.espn.go.com/columns/story?id=498263&root=mls&cc=5901
As his list suggests, there are some real gems even deep in the SuperDrafts (of course, there are a few dogs in every first round too...) Davis' list is interesting, but he could have gone further:
37th overall, 2006: Johnathan Bornstein. Geez. The guy's left-footed-- sometimes it seems like a one-legged man could play in MLS, as long as he's left-footed. What took people so long to see the potential in the US National Team defender?
35th overall, 2005: Gonzalo Segares. A starting defender for the Fire almost since he was drafted, a finalist for Rookie of the Year, and a fringe Costa Rican national teamer.
34th overall, 2004: Josh Gros. Though sadly taking a year off from DC United due to effects from a possibly serious head injury, Gros is one of those guys you'd love to have on any team. He works hard, his skill is underrated and he's got a great understanding of the game. He's a workhorse, but even so, earned himself a cap with the US national team against Mexico.
36th overall, 2004: Michael Bradley. The kid who's now a near-lock starter for the national team and who's scored 7 goals from d-mid for his team in Holland was by no means a sure-thing in MLS. Although some fans didn't want to believe it, Bradley started to become an important player in MLS. Still, his game didn't take off until he left for Holland.
21st in the supplemental draft, 1997: Kerry Zavagnin. Another guy who might not be flashy, but who's proved himself in this league. To this day, he'd still start for most teams, and was an occasional national teamer.
Not a bad list for guys who didn't even make Davis' list, right? And this isn't even including guys like Corey Gibbs, who were picked late because they were likely headed overseas (LA in 2002 and Miami in 2001 both took late round fliers on him). It seems a little odd for Davis to include Arnaud and Christman-- both players I like, but who aren't quite on the level of Bradley or Bornstein.
A side note: one of the things that struck me while going down the lists is how much deeper the draft seems to be now. But is that the result of college soccer producing better players (unlikely), the improvement of scouting (definitely possible) or the fact that younger, talented players view MLS as a stable possibility and forego years of college (or simply skip it altogether)? I think all three are all somewhat true, but the latter two probably contribute most the depth of the draft. I'd love to take a look at whether players in the draft are getting younger (I think they are). Of course, the fact that so many decent players have been picked in the third or fourth round in recent years also suggests that, while scouting may have improved, it's still got a ways to go...
Friday, January 4, 2008
When the next big thing isn't
Spare a thought for Santino Quaranta, who was waived by the Red Bulls the other day. He was among the most promising players when he made his MLS debut at age 16. While it's tempting to think that Quaranta's struggles (and bogus All-Star selection in his first year as a commissioner's pick) foreshadowed some of Freddy Adu's issues, the truth is that Quaranta managed to fight back from adversity to reach a higher level in MLS that Adu only achieved after he left. Quaranta's still young, so who knows what will happen, but he could have been a star. I hope he finds a way to make a soccer a career, even if it's not at the MLS level.
But Quaranta is also a cautionary tale for reactionary fans who are always ready to annoit the next big thing. Because fans hate failure, they irrationally despise former heroes who have failed them once. A young player, never touched by failure, becomes an appropriate object onto which unrealistic expectations can be placed. Then, when this player fails, as all players must, the fan then looks to the next big thing, conveniently forgetting that he went through the same process years earlier.
It turns out Bruce Arena wasn't an idiot for playing Brian McBride instead of Mike Magee. It turns out that Eddie Gaven wasn't a surefire replacement for Claudio Reyna. Or that Benny Feilhaber had made Landon Donovan expendable. Instead of discarding people when they fail, why not instead see what they do about it?
But Quaranta is also a cautionary tale for reactionary fans who are always ready to annoit the next big thing. Because fans hate failure, they irrationally despise former heroes who have failed them once. A young player, never touched by failure, becomes an appropriate object onto which unrealistic expectations can be placed. Then, when this player fails, as all players must, the fan then looks to the next big thing, conveniently forgetting that he went through the same process years earlier.
It turns out Bruce Arena wasn't an idiot for playing Brian McBride instead of Mike Magee. It turns out that Eddie Gaven wasn't a surefire replacement for Claudio Reyna. Or that Benny Feilhaber had made Landon Donovan expendable. Instead of discarding people when they fail, why not instead see what they do about it?
Monday, November 26, 2007
The MLS Playoff System, Post Mortem, Ad Naseum, Et Cetera-- Where the Critics have a point...
Now that the dust has settled on the MLS playoffs, it's as decent a time as any to take another look at the MLS playoff format.
Taking the 2007 playoffs into account, the higher seeds advance 70% in the first round. In the second round (single game elimination), the higher seeds advance 80% of the time (as both New England and Houston did this time around).
#2 seed Houston, of course, won the whole thing against fellow #2 seed New England.
So why was everyone complaining? I think there's a few arguments.
1. Quality of Play. Other formats might create more attractive games.
2. Creating incentives for intense play in the regular season. Rewarding higher seeds more (or differently) might make the regular season more meaningul.
3. Rewarding strong regular season performance. #3 is sort of the flip side to #2-- central to #3 is the idea that a team that does well in the regular season ought to have an easier road to the championship. The playoffs ought to reduce the number of fluke results for such teams.
As I've stated before, #2 and #3 appear to be dealt with pretty well by the current system. MLS high seeds already advance at a very rate. Making the rate even higher might have the perverse effect of making the playoffs seem less compelling if fans think the playoffs are just a rubber stamp affair.
But, even with a 70% advancement rate with higher seeds, the MLS playoff critics still have a few points.
1. Higher seeds win because they are better teams-- not because of the playoff format. This argument is 50% brilliance and 50% not-so-brilliance. First, the not-so-brilliant part: the higher seeds are only playing against teams that that they are better than because... wait for it... playing weak teams is part of the format's reward for being a higher seed. And the stats have shown that it's a pretty hefty advantage indeed.
But here's a more nuanced take: higher seeds aren't given much other advantage in the two-leg format. If a higher seed is hit by inopportune injuries (like Razov and Galindo's injuries for #1 Chivas USA, or Emilio and Moreno's injuries for #1 DC United), then their "better team" advantage evaporates because of bad timing. Injuries are a fact of life in sports, but this doesn't seem entirely "fair" that the playoff advantage gained from an entire season of work could be destroyed because of injuries at precisely the wrong moment. This is precisely the case where you'd want a higher seed to get a more concrete advantage, such as playing an extra game at home.
Then there's also this developing problem: Right now, MLS playoff teams include a few teams below 0.500. The worst MLS playoff teams are frequently pretty bad teams. However, when the league expands to 16 teams, gone will be the days when the 8 seed is a below 0.500 team. The 8 seed will be a progressively better team with each expansion of the league. What's this mean? It means that the advantage for high seeds in the current format will be correspondingly diminished. If, in five years, we start to see 1 and 2 seeds start to fall regularly to their lower seeded opponents, we'll need to revisit the playoff format.
2. The playoff format doesn't reward regular season prowess. Obviously, the stats show that the regular season is rewarded in the post-season with advancement about 70% of the time. But what if, as I suggested previously, no onr believes that the format is rewarding, even though the stats show that it positively is? Fans won't believe the regular season to be meaningful and players won't play like it is.
There are a couple of reasons why this might actually be the case.
A. Playing weaker teams only gives you a bonus if you actually play hard and are better. So your reward for playing hard and being better all season is... two more games of needing to play harder and be better in the playoffs. People like getting perks: having home field advantage is a little like getting a perk-- if a home team plays a visitor even, they'll likely win.
B. The MLS playoff format isn't an intuitively obvious reward as it is in other US leagues. The rewards might not be concrete enough or be compelling in small increments (i.e. would you rather play the Fire as a #1 seed or the Wizards as a #2 seed). Economists are frequently confounded by evidence that people frequently make irrational decisions because of little presnetational differences. If that's the case in MLS, maybe we need to re-think how the playoff format is presented to the players.
Taking the 2007 playoffs into account, the higher seeds advance 70% in the first round. In the second round (single game elimination), the higher seeds advance 80% of the time (as both New England and Houston did this time around).
#2 seed Houston, of course, won the whole thing against fellow #2 seed New England.
So why was everyone complaining? I think there's a few arguments.
1. Quality of Play. Other formats might create more attractive games.
2. Creating incentives for intense play in the regular season. Rewarding higher seeds more (or differently) might make the regular season more meaningul.
3. Rewarding strong regular season performance. #3 is sort of the flip side to #2-- central to #3 is the idea that a team that does well in the regular season ought to have an easier road to the championship. The playoffs ought to reduce the number of fluke results for such teams.
As I've stated before, #2 and #3 appear to be dealt with pretty well by the current system. MLS high seeds already advance at a very rate. Making the rate even higher might have the perverse effect of making the playoffs seem less compelling if fans think the playoffs are just a rubber stamp affair.
But, even with a 70% advancement rate with higher seeds, the MLS playoff critics still have a few points.
1. Higher seeds win because they are better teams-- not because of the playoff format. This argument is 50% brilliance and 50% not-so-brilliance. First, the not-so-brilliant part: the higher seeds are only playing against teams that that they are better than because... wait for it... playing weak teams is part of the format's reward for being a higher seed. And the stats have shown that it's a pretty hefty advantage indeed.
But here's a more nuanced take: higher seeds aren't given much other advantage in the two-leg format. If a higher seed is hit by inopportune injuries (like Razov and Galindo's injuries for #1 Chivas USA, or Emilio and Moreno's injuries for #1 DC United), then their "better team" advantage evaporates because of bad timing. Injuries are a fact of life in sports, but this doesn't seem entirely "fair" that the playoff advantage gained from an entire season of work could be destroyed because of injuries at precisely the wrong moment. This is precisely the case where you'd want a higher seed to get a more concrete advantage, such as playing an extra game at home.
Then there's also this developing problem: Right now, MLS playoff teams include a few teams below 0.500. The worst MLS playoff teams are frequently pretty bad teams. However, when the league expands to 16 teams, gone will be the days when the 8 seed is a below 0.500 team. The 8 seed will be a progressively better team with each expansion of the league. What's this mean? It means that the advantage for high seeds in the current format will be correspondingly diminished. If, in five years, we start to see 1 and 2 seeds start to fall regularly to their lower seeded opponents, we'll need to revisit the playoff format.
2. The playoff format doesn't reward regular season prowess. Obviously, the stats show that the regular season is rewarded in the post-season with advancement about 70% of the time. But what if, as I suggested previously, no onr believes that the format is rewarding, even though the stats show that it positively is? Fans won't believe the regular season to be meaningful and players won't play like it is.
There are a couple of reasons why this might actually be the case.
A. Playing weaker teams only gives you a bonus if you actually play hard and are better. So your reward for playing hard and being better all season is... two more games of needing to play harder and be better in the playoffs. People like getting perks: having home field advantage is a little like getting a perk-- if a home team plays a visitor even, they'll likely win.
B. The MLS playoff format isn't an intuitively obvious reward as it is in other US leagues. The rewards might not be concrete enough or be compelling in small increments (i.e. would you rather play the Fire as a #1 seed or the Wizards as a #2 seed). Economists are frequently confounded by evidence that people frequently make irrational decisions because of little presnetational differences. If that's the case in MLS, maybe we need to re-think how the playoff format is presented to the players.
Sunday, November 25, 2007
Why UEFA World Cup Qualification is Silly
Some folks are celebrating England's failure to qualify for the 2008 European Championship. I'll admit to joining in, just a little bit. Teams like Croatia can't be toyed with. While England may, in fact, be a superior team, Croatia had played consistently well and already shown it was capable of beating in England in Zagreb.
But do I really and truly believe England shouldn't be at the Euros? No. I think they're definitely stronger than either of the hosts. They're probably stronger than Greece and Turkey. Come to think of it, I think they'd be favorites against half the teams that did make it to the tournament.
So, while it's only fair to call out England's manager and players for a thouroughly uninspiring campaign, the UEFA qualifying system is absolute garbage. Depending on the strength of the group, a team might play only four meaningful matches. And the top teams will never play each other. We know Turkey can beat Greece and Norway, but that's an entirely different task than beating Italy and Germany.
So while there are almost always great teams among the failed contenders in UEFA, there are almost always terrible teams among the survivors-- teams that are almost guaranteed to be flops at the World Cup. We're left with the counter-intuitive situation where some are clamoring for more World Cup spots for UEFA based on the quality of teams that UEFA leaves behind, while others rightly point out that the continent also qualified the worst team in the 2006 World Cup (Serbia) and a couple of the monumental failures in 2002.
Of course, there will always be teams that underperform. And I believe UEFA has the deepest pool of talent of any confederation. But it's their responsibility to get the right teams to the big tournaments.
And frankly, the 2010 qualification draw for UEFA looks to set an all-time record for terrible. The Czech Republic may need to play precisely one meaningful match (against Poland on the road) to advance. On the plus side, Israel's in a very tight, competitive group and has its best shot at advancing to the World Cup in recent years. But the down side is that their toughest matches (against Greece and Switzerland) will not tell us much about their quality against top opponents. Do we really want to see the Netherlands beat Norway and Scotland to go the World Cup?
Now, of course, there will be upsets. There will always be upsets. But there are upsets on one hand, and flukes on the other. You don't want to determine participation in the WOrld Cup based on a couple of fluke results. But that's precisely what's guaranteed to happen yet again.
But do I really and truly believe England shouldn't be at the Euros? No. I think they're definitely stronger than either of the hosts. They're probably stronger than Greece and Turkey. Come to think of it, I think they'd be favorites against half the teams that did make it to the tournament.
So, while it's only fair to call out England's manager and players for a thouroughly uninspiring campaign, the UEFA qualifying system is absolute garbage. Depending on the strength of the group, a team might play only four meaningful matches. And the top teams will never play each other. We know Turkey can beat Greece and Norway, but that's an entirely different task than beating Italy and Germany.
So while there are almost always great teams among the failed contenders in UEFA, there are almost always terrible teams among the survivors-- teams that are almost guaranteed to be flops at the World Cup. We're left with the counter-intuitive situation where some are clamoring for more World Cup spots for UEFA based on the quality of teams that UEFA leaves behind, while others rightly point out that the continent also qualified the worst team in the 2006 World Cup (Serbia) and a couple of the monumental failures in 2002.
Of course, there will always be teams that underperform. And I believe UEFA has the deepest pool of talent of any confederation. But it's their responsibility to get the right teams to the big tournaments.
And frankly, the 2010 qualification draw for UEFA looks to set an all-time record for terrible. The Czech Republic may need to play precisely one meaningful match (against Poland on the road) to advance. On the plus side, Israel's in a very tight, competitive group and has its best shot at advancing to the World Cup in recent years. But the down side is that their toughest matches (against Greece and Switzerland) will not tell us much about their quality against top opponents. Do we really want to see the Netherlands beat Norway and Scotland to go the World Cup?
Now, of course, there will be upsets. There will always be upsets. But there are upsets on one hand, and flukes on the other. You don't want to determine participation in the WOrld Cup based on a couple of fluke results. But that's precisely what's guaranteed to happen yet again.
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